Brain Cipher Ransomware: Attack Chain, ESXi Recovery, and IOCs



Brain Cipher ransomware has attacked organizations since mid-June 2024, using encryptors built from leaked tools: the LockBit 3.0 builder for Windows and Babuk source code for VMware ESXi. In its best-known attacks, the group encrypted servers at Indonesia’s temporary national data center in June 2024 and stole data from Rhode Island’s Deloitte-managed RIBridges benefits system. At least two US companies faced class-action lawsuits in September 2026 within days of appearing on Brain Cipher’s leak site.
If Brain Cipher has encrypted your servers, especially ESXi hosts, contact Proven Data’s incident response team before wiping or rebuilding them.
Brain Cipher ransomware at a glance
| Attribute | Details |
|---|---|
| First observed | Mid-June 2024 |
| Also written as | BrainCipher |
| Operators | Identity and location unknown |
| Operating model | Not established |
| Extortion model | Double extortion |
| Initial access | VPN logins with valid credentials (two disclosed cases) |
| Encryptors | Leaked LockBit 3.0 builder (Windows); leaked Babuk code (ESXi) |
| Encryption | Salsa20 + RSA-1024 (Windows); SOSEMANUK + Curve25519 (ESXi) |
| Encrypted file extension | Random 9 characters per build (Windows); .encrptd (ESXi) |
| Ransom note filename | <extension>.README.txt (Windows); How To Restore Your Files.txt (ESXi) |
| Ransom demands | $20,000 to $8 million (reported in 2024) |
| Public decryptor | Only for Indonesia’s ESXi servers (released by the group) |
| Notable attacks | Indonesia’s temporary national data center, France’s RMN-Grand Palais museum network, Rhode Island’s RIBridges (all 2024) |
| Sanctions | Not named on OFAC, UK, EU or Australian lists (checked November 2026) |
| Status | Active as of November 2026 |
What is Brain Cipher ransomware?
The operators behind the Brain Cipher ransomware group run double-extortion attacks and, as of November 2026, are still naming new organizations on their leak site, but they have not been publicly identified. Neither CISA nor the FBI has published an advisory on the group.
The group’s structure is disputed. Fortinet said in July 2024 that the ransomware did not appear to be offered as a service, while Group-IB later called Brain Cipher a ransomware-as-a-service group without giving details.
Gaps on Brain Cipher’s leak site do not mean a pause in attacks. Twice, trackers recorded no new listings for almost three months, in mid-2025 and from late October 2025 to late January 2026. Yet after each gap, the group listed at least one organization that had been attacked during it. Listings in 2026 already outnumber those of 2024 and 2025 combined, and the group still uses its 2024 leak-site address and contact email scheme.
Is Brain Cipher ransomware linked to LockBit or other groups?
There is no public evidence that Brain Cipher’s operators are part of the LockBit operation. Brain Cipher has built its Windows encryptor with the LockBit 3.0 builder that leaked in 2022, which ties it to LockBit’s code, not necessarily to the people behind LockBit. Other threat actors also use the leaked builder, and Brain Cipher claimed the Indonesian attack under its own name.
Group-IB suspects Brain Cipher’s operators previously ran the EstateRansomware and SenSayQ brands, based on similar ransom notes, contact addresses, and leak-site code. Later reports mostly repeat the link without new evidence.
What are the biggest Brain Cipher ransomware attacks?
Brain Cipher’s biggest attacks by impact hit Indonesia’s temporary national data center and Rhode Island’s RIBridges benefits system. The data center attack affected 167 of the 282 agencies hosted there, by the government’s July count, and the RIBridges breach affected 644,401 people.
What happened at Indonesia’s temporary national data center?
In June 2024, Brain Cipher took down services of agencies hosted at the temporary national data center in Surabaya, starting with automated immigration gates at international airports. Indonesia’s cyber agency, BSSN, named the group within days. Brain Cipher demanded $8 million to provide a decryptor and not publish the data. BSSN said it had seen no large outbound data transfers so far, while the group claimed it had taken data.
The government refused to pay, although only about 44 of the 282 hosted agencies had backups good enough to restore right away. The head of BSSN said just 2% of the data had been copied to a cold backup site. In early July, the group apologized and released a decryptor for the data center’s ESXi servers, but no key for Windows systems.
Did Brain Cipher breach Deloitte?
Deloitte says its own network was not breached: the data Brain Cipher listed as “Deloitte UK” on December 4, 2024, came from a client’s system. On December 16, Deloitte confirmed that the system in the Brain Cipher data breach was RIBridges, a benefits system it maintains and operates for Rhode Island.
The state’s RIBridges investigation summary traces the intrusion back to July 2024, and no evidence of ransomware execution was found. Rhode Island says the attackers gained access through unauthorized use of Deloitte credentials, but the investigation could not determine how they obtained them.
At the end of December 2024, the group started releasing RIBridges files. The state mailed notices to 735,501 people who may have been affected; the investigation put the number affected at 644,401.
Deloitte agreed to pay Rhode Island a total of $12 million and provided $6 million in services at no charge. Under the April 2026 settlement, neither side admits liability. The state attorney general also opened a civil investigation into Deloitte, with no outcome announced by November 2026. In a May 2025 motion to dismiss a consolidated class action, Deloitte wrote that RIBridges was the target of a cyberattack “orchestrated by a cybercriminal gang known as ‘Brain Cipher.’”
Which other organizations listed by Brain Cipher have confirmed an incident?
Besides Indonesia and Rhode Island, 12 organizations listed by Brain Cipher have publicly acknowledged an incident as of November 2026. France’s cybersecurity agency tied the attack on one of them, the RMN-Grand Palais museum network, to the group in its 2024 cyber threat overview. The other 11 are matched to their listings by name, dates or content.
| Organization | Incident date | What it confirmed |
|---|---|---|
| Apex Global Solutions (US) | June-July 2024 | Data of about 390,000 patients of its clients accessed and taken |
| RMN-Grand Palais (France) | August 2024 | Software shared by several museums made unavailable; no data theft detected at the time |
| Hanwa Thailand | September 2024 | Apparent ransomware; servers and PCs shut down and reinitialized; no data theft confirmed |
| Cotecal (Argentina) | October 2024 | Ransomware encrypted critical data and services |
| Baltimore Medical System (US) | July 2025 | Files accessed or copied; no encryption |
| bwlv (Germany) | July 2025 | Part of IT encrypted; signs of data theft |
| Oxford County (Canada) | September 2025 | Files accessed or taken; Ontario privacy regulator opened an investigation |
| Kansai Integrated Systems (Japan) | November-December 2025 | Servers encrypted; no data theft confirmed |
| Sterling Global Financial (Bahamas) | May 2026 | Indiana breach filing; 8,203 people in all |
| The Mint Gaming Hall (US) | June 2026 | Indiana breach filing; 3,581 people in all |
| Robroy Industries (US) | June 2026 | Indiana breach filing; 271 people in all |
| Golden State Orthopedics & Spine (US) | By early July 2026 | Patient data may have been exposed |
Disclaimer: Victim listings on ransomware leak sites represent unverified claims made by the threat actor. Treat them as unconfirmed unless company disclosures, SEC filings, regulatory notifications, or law enforcement confirm them.
How does Brain Cipher ransomware extort victims?
Brain Cipher steals data, encrypts systems or both, and leaves a ransom note on the systems it encrypts. It then lists the victim on its leak site, usually with a countdown of about a day to three weeks, after which the listing can link to the data. The group has followed through: its file servers have hosted download archives named after many organizations it listed in 2024 and 2025.
Brain Cipher listed two organizations with confirmed incidents before they noticed the attack. Deloitte found suspicious activity in RIBridges after being alerted to the “Deloitte UK” listing, and Golden State Orthopedics & Spine noticed unusual activity around July 2, 2026, a day after its listing appeared.
Baltimore Medical System, by contrast, was listed almost two months after the intruder’s access ended, so an organization that has not been listed may still have lost data.
What does the Brain Cipher ransom note say?
The short note Brain Cipher drops on Windows systems is addressed to managers, promises recovery within hours and tells victims to keep away from police and recovery firms:
Dear managers!
[...]
We can recover your systems within 4-6 hours.
[...]
1.Don’t go to the police, etc.
2.Do not attempt to recover data on your own.
3.Do not take the help of third-party data recovery companies.
This version of the note names no ransom amount, only a Tor portal, an encryption ID and an email address. Later Windows notes and the ESXi note, both seen by August 2024, add a threat to post the victim on the leak site if it does not make contact within 48 hours.
The ESXi note keeps Babuk’s default name, How To Restore Your Files.txt; the group’s name appears only in the text, which opens with “Welcome to Brain Cipher Ransomware!”
Ransomware trackers also list a longer note, <id>.README_2.txt, which demands a response within 72 hours, warns of fines under GDPR and CCPA and says the group has prepared instructions to help the victim’s clients file class actions. No public evidence links that threat to the lawsuits filed after Brain Cipher listings.
What legal fallout follows a Brain Cipher ransomware attack?
In September 2026, proposed US class actions were filed against Gold Star Mortgage and AECOM within four days of their Brain Cipher listings, although neither had publicly confirmed the claimed breach. The Gold Star suit was voluntarily dismissed on November 4. Complaints against both companies cite posts by ransomware trackers. Another AECOM complaint, filed two days after the first, cites a tracker to blame a different group, MetaEncryptor, which listed the company the same day as Brain Cipher.
A Brain Cipher mention in a complaint is not proof of attribution. At least 14 complaints repeat boilerplate saying the plaintiff’s data has been or will be published “by the Brain Cipher cybercriminal group or other cybercriminals on the dark web,” although the defendants do not appear in the group’s leak-site records.
Suits over two confirmed breaches have ended in settlements, with both companies denying wrongdoing. A federal court gave final approval to the RIBridges class-action settlement for $6.3 million in January 2026. In May 2026, a Florida state court gave final approval to the Apex settlement, which offered up to $3,500 per person for documented losses.
At RIBridges, Sterling Global Financial, Baltimore Medical System and Apex, the earliest known notification letters to individuals went out roughly four to ten months after each incident began. The RIBridges intrusion went unnoticed until the December 2024 leak-site listing, and letters there went out about five weeks after Deloitte alerted Rhode Island.
What does a Brain Cipher ransomware intrusion look like?
In the two intrusions later claimed by Brain Cipher where the entry point is known, the attackers logged in through a VPN with valid credentials. They then stayed for weeks or months: about six weeks at Kansai Integrated Systems before encrypting its servers, and almost five months at RIBridges.
At RIBridges, the investigation traced this sequence:
- July 2, 2024: the earliest documented login came through a non-production VPN. MFA logs were not retained, so it is unknown whether MFA was triggered or bypassed on the attackers’ VPN sessions.
- Within the next 11 days: the attackers used Remote Desktop for lateral movement, escalated privileges through Image File Execution Options injection, harvested credentials, and set up a reverse proxy and commercial remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools on a domain controller. A scheduled task launched the proxy.
- November 11 to 28, 2024: the firewall recorded 397 alerts for large outbound transfers to external cloud storage.
In Indonesia, the attackers began trying to disable Microsoft Defender more than two days before they installed malicious files and stopped services, at which point Defender crashed.
Many reports repeat the claim that Brain Cipher exploits CVE-2023-28252, a privilege-escalation flaw in the Windows Common Log File System driver, and some even name it as the group’s entry point. No verifiable evidence supports either claim, and as a local flaw, it could not have been the entry point. Phishing is also commonly named, but no documented Brain Cipher case shows it.
No public Brain Cipher case shows how the encryptor reached each Windows host or how the attackers gained access to ESXi hosts. Builds made with the leaked LockBit 3.0 builder can be set to spread through Group Policy or PsExec once the attackers hold domain admin rights, so check both when scoping an intrusion.
Brain Cipher ransomware MITRE ATT&CK techniques
MITRE ATT&CK has no entry for Brain Cipher, so the techniques below come from the intrusions above and public analyses of the group’s samples, in ATT&CK v20.1 terms.
| Tactic | Technique (ID) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | External Remote Services (T1133) | RIBridges, Kansai |
| Initial Access | Valid Accounts (T1078) | RIBridges, Kansai |
| Persistence | Scheduled Task (T1053.005) | RIBridges |
| Privilege Escalation | Image File Execution Options Injection (T1546.012) | RIBridges |
| Privilege Escalation | Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) | Samples |
| Stealth | File Deletion (T1070.004) | Samples |
| Defense Impairment | Disable or Modify Tools (T1685, formerly T1562.001) | Indonesia, samples |
| Defense Impairment | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log (T1685.001, formerly T1562.002) | Samples |
| Credential Access | Credential harvesting (no technique ID; tool not disclosed) | RIBridges |
| Lateral Movement | Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) | RIBridges |
| Command and Control | Proxy (T1090) | RIBridges |
| Command and Control | Remote Access Tools (T1219) | RIBridges |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) | RIBridges |
| Impact | Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) | Indonesia, Kansai, samples |
| Impact | Service Stop (T1489) | Indonesia, samples |
| Impact | Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) | Samples (VSS service disabled) |
How does Brain Cipher ransomware avoid detection?
Brain Cipher’s Windows encryptor, like other LockBit 3.0 builds, tries to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus, Defender for Endpoint, Windows Security Center, Software Protection and the Volume Shadow Copy service before encrypting. A 2024 Brain Cipher sample disabled the services through direct API calls, so the registry writes came from services.exe and left no command line for process-creation rules to catch. A sample first seen in April 2025 also launched sc.exe and schtasks.exe, which process-creation rules can see.
According to CISA, LockBit 3.0 builds also delete shadow copies from inside the process through WMI rather than with vssadmin, so do not count on them surviving even if no vssadmin command was seen.
The builds disable Windows Event Log channels, restrict access to them and may clear the logs, which can leave Event Viewer empty on encrypted hosts. Collect any remaining log files and rely on centrally forwarded logs. Because the encryptor can delete itself, look for a retained copy in EDR or antivirus quarantine.
What still catches Brain Cipher ransomware?
Microsoft Defender and other antivirus engines label Brain Cipher’s Windows builds as LockBit or BlackMatter, and Defender labels the ESXi build as Babuk. An alert under any of these names may be Brain Cipher. Elastic’s open YARA rules Windows_Ransomware_Lockbit_369e1e94 and Linux_Ransomware_Babuk_bd216cab match all Windows and ESXi samples in the IOC table below.
For threat hunting, look for registry writes (Sysmon Event ID 13) that, within a short window, change two values on the service keys of Defender, Security Center, Software Protection and shadow copy services (WinDefend, WdNisSvc, WdFilter, WdBoot, WdNisDrv, Sense, SecurityHealthService, wscsvc, sppsvc, VSS and vmicvss):
Startset to 4DeleteFlagset to 1
Also look for any of these keys being deleted outright (Sysmon Event ID 12), as one 2024 Brain Cipher sample did with VSS. Do not filter out writes by services.exe, even though uninstalling software can trigger the same pattern. Check that your Sysmon configuration records these events: the widely used SwiftOnSecurity configuration logs Start changes, but not DeleteFlag writes or service key deletions.
To catch Brain Cipher’s Windows builds tampering with event logs, watch for changes to ChannelAccess and Enabled under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels.
Brain Cipher ransomware IOCs
Because the file patterns below match any build’s random extension, they can catch new Brain Cipher builds that the hashes miss, although other LockBit 3.0 builds leave the same Windows patterns.
The analyzed samples contain no C2 address. Besides the two Vultr addresses below, early reports list many IP addresses, such as Windows and Edge update servers, that are sandbox noise and should not be blocked.
| Indicator | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| eb82946fa0de261e92f8f60aa878c9fef9ebb34fdababa66995403b110118b12 | SHA256 (Windows) | win.exe in BSSN’s list; earliest public sample, June 2024 |
| 6e07da23603fbe5b26755df5b8fec19cadf1f7001b1558ea4f12e20271263417 | SHA256 (Windows) | win_old.exe in BSSN’s list |
| 2c9bb93dc2c9f841e58db43ba7dedd490cf7e0fd9e66c4b56a888e25e93a510c | SHA256 (Windows) | First seen April 2025 |
| f0a47eb439647506b9bcbea84a4811da5dc3838df6f585cf3cc362dc41919c67 | SHA256 (ELF) | ESXi build with the Brain Cipher note text |
| <9 alphanumeric>.README.txt | Ransom note | Windows; same 9 characters as the file extension, created in bulk (Sysmon Event ID 11) |
| <7 alphanumeric>.<9 alphanumeric> | Encrypted file name | Windows, when file-name encryption is on |
| .encrptd, How To Restore Your Files.txt | Encrypted file extension, ransom note | ESXi |
| brain.support[@]cyberfear[.]com, brain.decrypt[@]cyberfear[.]com | Ransom notes | |
| brain.dataleak[@]cyberfear[.]com | Leak-site listings since late 2024 | |
| vkvsgl7l[...]w4w5hyd[.]onion | Tor address | Leak site since June 2024 |
| 209.250.254[.]15, 64.176.55[.]90 | IP addresses | On BSSN’s Brain Cipher IOC list (July 2024); Vultr hosting, role not explained |
What encryption does Brain Cipher ransomware use?
On Windows, Brain Cipher uses the standard LockBit 3.0 scheme: it gives each file its own Salsa20 key, encrypts those keys with a second Salsa20 key shared by up to 1,000 files, and protects that key with the build’s RSA-1024 public key. Without the matching private key, which the operators hold, there is no general way to decrypt the files.
Like other LockBit 3.0 builds, the encryptor overwrites files in place, leaving no original copy to undelete, but encrypts large files only in chunks, so parts of them stay unencrypted. The description above comes from earlier samples: as of November 2026, no confirmed Brain Cipher sample first seen in 2026 has been publicly analyzed.
How does Brain Cipher ransomware encrypt VMware ESXi?
On ESXi hosts, Brain Cipher has used an encryptor built from leaked Babuk source code. Like the original Babuk code, the build used in Indonesia encrypts only the first 520 MiB (about 545 MB) of each large virtual machine file, leaving most of a big virtual disk untouched. Each file gets its own SOSEMANUK key, derived through Curve25519.
How do you contain a Brain Cipher ransomware attack?
Containing a Brain Cipher ransomware attack starts by cutting affected systems off the network, a step Kansai Integrated Systems and bwlv both took, and by calling Proven Data’s emergency incident response line. Engage breach counsel on the first day too: proposed class actions have been filed within days of Brain Cipher listings. Magdy Abdelaziz, Proven Data’s Head of DFIR, explains what happens when the evidence cannot show exactly which files were read:
The scoping standard shifts from “what did they take” to “what could they have taken.”
Then work through these steps:
- Scope the incident to cover systems an IT provider runs for you and systems you run for clients: RIBridges data was listed under the name of its operator, Deloitte. Treat a Brain Cipher listing of your organization or your IT provider as grounds for an immediate investigation, even without other signs of intrusion.
- Report the attack to the FBI’s IC3 or CISA as early as possible, even though the ransom note says not to go to the police. During the RIBridges response, CISA shared information on Brain Cipher with Rhode Island to help check other systems for compromise.
- Copy VPN, firewall and MFA or identity-provider logs from the source systems, not only from the SIEM, before they roll over, and review them as far back as they go. The firewall’s records of how much data left RIBridges were not sent to the SIEM.
- Use your firewall logs to determine how much data left and when, starting with large uploads to cloud storage, the route seen at RIBridges. Breach counsel will need this for notices.
- Search domain controllers and other servers for RMM tools you did not install and for scheduled tasks that start a proxy, as at RIBridges. Also look for
client32.exeand other NetSupport Manager components, which are on the Brain Cipher IOC list BSSN released during the Indonesian incident. - Reset every VPN account, including accounts for test and other non-production environments. Also reset privileged domain accounts: the last attacker session found at RIBridges ran on a domain controller under a privileged account. If a domain controller may have been compromised, change the krbtgt password twice as part of Active Directory recovery, waiting for the first change to replicate before the second.
- Throughout the response, keep encrypted servers intact to preserve ransomware evidence while you rebuild the rest, as Kansai Integrated Systems did. For encrypted ESXi hosts, there is a second reason: most of a large virtual disk may be left unencrypted.
Can you recover from Brain Cipher ransomware without paying?
As of November 2026, no universal Brain Cipher decryptor exists, but data on encrypted ESXi hosts may be partially recoverable without a key: the Babuk-based build used in Indonesia encrypted only the first 520 MiB of each large virtual disk. The researcher who reverse-engineered the decryptor Brain Cipher released for Indonesia tested recovery without a key on lab virtual machines and estimates that, in many cases, 50% to 100% of the data can be restored.
He warns that results are worse for:
- Windows Server 2022
- non-standard partitioning or file systems
- a virtual machine’s second and later disks, whose first 520 MiB may hold data rather than the operating system
Only data comes back; you have to reinstall the operating system. No published analysis has checked whether later Brain Cipher builds keep the 520 MiB limit, so confirm how much of each disk was actually encrypted before counting on the untouched part.
Without the operators’ private key, files encrypted by the Windows build come back mainly from backups or surviving shadow copies, and recovery specialists can sometimes extract data from the unencrypted parts of large files, even though those files no longer open normally.
The same researcher also decrypted some files in lab tests through a keystream-reuse flaw in how some LockBit 3.0 builds encrypt the metadata that holds each file’s key. He says the flaw affects the Windows sample he links to the Indonesian attack. This decryption method works only if another file encrypted under the same shared key has a known original name much longer than the target file’s, and it fails on some newer builds.
No More Ransom has no Brain Cipher tool, and its LockBit 3.0 and Babuk tools have not been shown to work on Brain Cipher files. Proven Data’s ransomware recovery team can tell you which route fits your systems.
Does the decryptor released for Indonesia work for other Brain Cipher victims?
The ESXi decryptor Brain Cipher released for Indonesia should not be relied on for other victims: the group said its key works only for that data center and that this was “the first and last time a victim receives keys for free.” No one has reported testing it elsewhere.
The tool needs the last 32 bytes of each file to rebuild that file’s key. It reads those bytes, cuts them off and then decrypts the file in place without checking that it has the right key. A wrong key or an interrupted run can therefore leave the encrypted part impossible to decrypt, even on a later run with the right key.
Keep the original .encrptd files and run any decryptor, including one obtained from the group, only on verified copies.
Has anyone paid the Brain Cipher ransom?
No Brain Cipher victim has confirmed paying as of November 2026, and no case shows what a paying victim gets back. Deloitte hired a negotiator over RIBridges, but no ransom payment has been reported. Indonesia refused to pay.
Even a working key does not mean a quick recovery. Indonesia needed months to recover after the group released its ESXi decryptor: decrypting 6,413 virtual machines took until mid-August, and by September 21 only 73% of 2,120 services were back.
Brain Cipher was not named on the OFAC, UK, EU or Australian sanctions lists checked in November 2026. But its operators are unidentified, so a payer cannot rule out that a Brain Cipher payment would reach a sanctioned person.
Under OFAC’s guidance on the sanctions risks of ransomware payments, civil penalties can apply to payments subject to US sanctions even if the payer did not know the payment was prohibited. The same guidance counts a complete report to law enforcement or CISA, made as soon as possible after the attack is discovered, as a significant mitigating factor.
DO NOT PAY THE RANSOM. Ransomware payment decisions carry legal, operational, and financial consequences, including potential OFAC sanctions exposure, and should be assessed with qualified legal counsel and an incident response team before deciding whether to engage with or pay the threat actor. That assessment must not delay containment, evidence preservation, required reporting, or recovery.
Security checklist
- Enforce MFA on every VPN, including those for test and other non-production environments. The attackers logged in with valid credentials through a VPN at Kansai Integrated Systems and through a non-production VPN at RIBridges.
- Send VPN, MFA, firewall and Windows event logs to your SIEM and keep them for at least six months. The state’s forensic investigation at RIBridges began five and a half months after the earliest documented attacker login, and some Windows event logs there were not collected centrally.
- Keep an allowlist of RMM tools, alert on any tool outside it, and alert on any new scheduled task on domain controllers. The attackers kept access at RIBridges through commercial RMM tools and a scheduled task.
- Act on alerts for large outbound transfers, especially to cloud storage. Such alerts fired at RIBridges for more than two weeks in November, before the leak-site listing in December.
- Keep tamper protection on in Microsoft Defender, and alert on every change it blocks (Event ID 5013) and on any security service set to disabled. In Indonesia, Defender crashed more than two days after the first attempts to disable it.
- Keep immutable, off-site backups of whole virtual machines and test restoring them. Brain Cipher has encrypted both ESXi and Windows systems, and in Indonesia, few affected agencies could restore right away.


Written by
Magdy Abdelaziz is a dedicated cybersecurity professional with over 7 years of extensive experience in digital forensics, incident response, reverse engineering, and security operations. He currently serves as Head of Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) at Proven Data LLC, leading a multinational team to develop and execute incident response strategies, align security initiatives with business objectives, and manage global-scale incidents.

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Content strategist at Proven Data focused on cybersecurity education, threat analysis, and ransomware awareness.





