What Is Threat Hunting? How It Works and What It Catches

Heloise Montini
Heloise Montini
&
Magdy Abdelaziz
Magdy Abdelaziz
&
Amr Fathy
Amr Fathy
·Published:
What is threat hunting? Learn how proactive, hypothesis-driven hunting works and what it catches that EDR and other automated tools consistently miss.

Threat hunting is the proactive search for intruders that automated defenses missed, and it’s how teams catch ransomware operators before they detonate. Ransomware rarely starts with the ransom note: in many incidents, the attacker has been inside for days or weeks, sometimes longer, before anything detonates. That gap between intrusion and detonation is where many organizations have little to no visibility, and hunting is built to close it.

If you're dealing with an active ransomware incident, a confirmed breach, or data already on a leak site, contact Proven Data's incident response team immediately.

What is threat hunting?

Threat hunting is a proactive, human-led search for threats that have already slipped past automated defenses (firewalls, antivirus, even EDR) without triggering an alert.

A hunter doesn't wait for a detection rule to fire. They start from a hypothesis: a new technique seen in the wild, an anomaly in log data, a tip from threat intelligence. Then they go looking for evidence that an intruder is already present.

This is different from monitoring. A Security Operations Center (SOC) watching a dashboard reacts to what the tools flag. A hunt assumes the systems missed something and goes looking anyway. That’s the kind of human-led investigation behind capabilities like persistent foothold detection, lateral movement detection, and behavioral process analysis inside Endpoint Defense.

Most hunts fall into one of three types:

  • Hypothesis-driven: built around a specific theory of threat actor behavior
  • Intelligence-driven: built around external indicators
  • Anomaly-driven: built around a deviation from an established baseline

All three share the same premise: assume compromise, then prove or disprove it.

What threat hunting actually finds

Threat hunting turns up three things automated tools consistently miss: the pre-encryption window before ransomware detonates, stale privileged access sitting unused, and EDR-evasion techniques. The last includes BYOVD driver abuse and living-off-the-land commands that mimic normal admin work.

Here's what each one looks like in practice.

The pre-encryption window

Before ransomware encrypts anything, a trained hunter learns to recognize a sequence. Magdy Abdelaziz, Head of DFIR (Digital Forensics and Incident Response) at Proven Data, describes it this way:

"Usually, the pre-encryption sequence: security tools being disabled, shadow copies being deleted, backup consoles being accessed, remote execution spreading across systems, and payloads being staged on admin shares. When those events cluster within minutes, we treat it as ransomware deployment in progress, not isolated suspicious activity."

A hunt actively watching for that cluster can catch it before encryption starts. A SOC waiting on an EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) alert may not: by the time encryption fires an alert, the deployment is already running. See a real example in our LockBit3 ransomware removal case study.

Stale privileged access

One of the most common findings in Proven Data's own post-incident work has nothing to do with sophisticated malware. Abdelaziz notes that stale privileged access ("old employee accounts, vendor VPN accounts, unused domain admins, backup admins, and forgotten service accounts") is "one of our standard post-ransomware audit paths," frequently the intruder's easiest route to escalation or lateral movement.

A hunt that reviews privileged access on a standing basis finds this before an adversary does. An IR team finds it after, during root-cause analysis, where insider-adjacent access risks also tend to surface.

EDR-evasion techniques

Amr Fathy, Senior DFIR Engineer at Proven Data, points to two blind spots that show why hunting matters even with EDR already in place. On BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks: "Attackers load a signed but vulnerable driver into kernel mode. Once there, they exploit it to terminate EDR processes and remove kernel callbacks. The driver loads, EDR goes blind, encryption begins within seconds."

On living-off-the-land tactics using tools like WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) and PowerShell: "The commands look identical to sysadmin activity. We differentiate by context: what account, what time, what source, what child processes," explains Fathy.

Neither trips a signature-based alert. Both are exactly what a human hunter, working from behavioral context rather than a static rule, is positioned to catch.

Threat hunting vs. incident response

Incident response (IR) is the structured, reactive process that starts the moment a security incident is confirmed (an alert, a report, a ransom note).

The goal isn't discovery; it's containment, eradication, and recovery, usually following a defined sequence: preparation, identification, containment, eradication, recovery, lessons learned.

The table below lays out threat hunting and incident response side by side, from

what triggers each to the skills each one takes.

AspectThreat HuntingIncident Response
TriggerNo alert: a hypothesis, intel, or suspicion of compromiseA confirmed alert, detection, or reported incident
TimingContinuous and ongoingTriggered, time-boxed
GoalFind unknown threats before they escalateContain, eradicate, and recover from a known one
SkillsHypothesis-building, behavioral analysis, TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) knowledgeForensics, containment, crisis communication
ScopeBroad: the whole environment, over timeNarrow: the specific incident at hand

Threat hunting and incident response are not the same practice. The gap between them is about direction, not urgency: an incident response team works backward, tracing the alert to its source, containing the blast radius, and recovering. A threat hunter works forward, starting from a hypothesis to find what's already there before it escalates, or before it's too late for an alert to matter.

That direction explains the other aspects. IR stays tight to the incident because that’s all the evidence shows so far, while hunting spans the whole environment because the hunter doesn’t yet know where to look. The skills split the same way: forensics and containment for evidence already in hand, behavioral analysis and TTP knowledge for signals nobody has flagged yet.

Tooling overlaps more than the skill sets do. Both draw on SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) and EDR data; the difference is who's driving. EDR and MDR (Managed Detection and Response) describe what the tooling does and who manages it, not which discipline is running.

SIEM and SOAR (Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response) are infrastructure both teams query. An IR team pulls logs to reconstruct an incident; a hunter queries the same logs looking for a pattern nobody reported yet.

Threat hunting vs. threat intelligence

Threat intelligence comes up constantly alongside hunting and incident response, and it's easy to confuse with hunting itself. Knowing the difference matters because they answer different questions about your risk.

Threat intelligence tells you what's happening out there: active ransomware groups, exploited vulnerabilities, and whether your domain or an employee's credentials have surfaced in a dark-web dump. Hunting confirms whether any of that is already true inside your environment.

Threat intelligence handles the external half: dark web monitoring, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) correlation, vendor breach tracking. On its own, that's visibility into risk, not proof of compromise; the hunt closes that gap.

Do you need managed threat hunting?

Not every organization needs managed threat hunting, and whether you do depends on staffing, tooling, and how far you trust automated detection alone.

If any of the following situations describe your environment, managed threat hunting paired with 24/7 monitoring covers that gap. The same principle drove our banking vulnerability assessment: find the gap before it’s exploited, not after.

No dedicated security staff

A lean IT team, or an MSP (Managed Service Provider) managing several clients' environments, doesn't have the bandwidth to run hunts manually. It shouldn't try to bolt one together from spare EDR licenses either. This is the gap managed threat hunting is designed to close: a 24/7 human-led SOC that runs the hunts instead of your internal team.

No one to proactively review cybersecurity data

EDR and SIEM generate the data a hunt needs, but unreviewed data isn't a hunt; it's a log pile. If nobody is actively looking for the indicator clusters described above, the tooling alone won't catch them.

Automated detection tools as the only cybersecurity line of defense

Relying solely on automated software leaves you vulnerable to human hands on the keyboard. As Abdelaziz notes:

"Human-operated ransomware is more damaging because the attacker adapts: they identify backups, find high-value data, disable defenses, steal information, choose timing, and pressure the business. The forensic tells are hands-on-keyboard commands, staged tools, targeted lateral movement."

Automated security tools are designed to catch automated, known attacks. Proactive threat hunting is built to catch a live human adversary adapting in real time.

How threat hunting and incident response work together

If you're comparing managed threat hunting providers, this is part of what you're actually paying for: hunting and incident response that feed each other, not two services running in isolation. The handoff between them, in either direction, is often where real exposure gets found.

The attacker who detonates the ransomware is often not the one who got in. Abdelaziz:

"In many cases, the ransomware operator is not the original intruder. Someone else obtained credentials, VPN access, RDP access, web-shell access, or remote-management access earlier and sold or transferred it. In the logs, we may see first access weeks or months before detonation, though in faster criminal ecosystems the handoff can also be same-day."

That gap, weeks or months of dwell time between initial access and detonation, is the entire window a hunt operates in. By the time an incident response team gets the call, that window has already closed.

The reverse holds too: findings from an IR engagement (a new threat actor technique, a specific persistence mechanism, a gap in logging) become the next hunt's hypothesis. Proven Data's own ransomware incident response actions and engagements like the legal firm ransomware incident response and housing company digital forensics case studies routinely surface exactly this kind of finding. That's why hunting and response work together here, instead of being handled as separate engagements.

Start with Proven Data's identity threat detection and response platform to put that hunt-and-response feedback loop to work in your own environment.

Heloise Montini

Written by

Heloise MontiniCybersecurity Content Writer

Cybersecurity writer at Proven Data covering ransomware trends, incident response, and data protection best practices.

Bachelor's degree, Social Communication - Journalism | São Paulo State University (UNESP)What is Generative AI and What are the Security Considerations? | BrightTALKHuman Factor in Organizations | Cruzeiro do Sul Virtual University
Magdy Abdelaziz

Written by

Magdy AbdelazizHead of DFIR

Magdy Abdelaziz is a dedicated cybersecurity professional with over 7 years of extensive experience in digital forensics, incident response, reverse engineering, and security operations. He currently serves as Head of Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) at Proven Data LLC, leading a multinational team to develop and execute incident response strategies, align security initiatives with business objectives, and manage global-scale incidents.

GIAC Strategic Planning, Policy, and Leadership (GSTRT) | Global Information Assurance CertificationGIAC Enterprise Incident Response (GEIR) | Global Information Assurance CertificationGIAC Certified Forensic Examiner (GCFE) | Global Information Assurance CertificationGIAC Certified Incident Handler (GCIH) | Global Information Assurance CertificationGIAC Certified Forensic Analyst (GCFA) | Global Information Assurance CertificationGIAC Reverse Engineering Malware (GREM) | Global Information Assurance CertificationGIAC Advisory Board Member | Global Information Assurance CertificationFaculty of Law English Section - Ain Shams University / Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.)
Amr Fathy

Written by

Amr FathySenior DFIR Engineer

Amr Fathy is a dedicated cybersecurity professional with over 7 years of extensive experience in digital forensics, incident response, reverse engineering, and threat intelligence. He currently serves as Senior DFIR Engineer at Proven Data LLC, conducting triage collection, incident response, and digital forensics activities.

Bachelor’s degree, Faculty of Computer Science, Ain Shams UniversityGIAC Certified Forensic Examiner (GCFE) | Global Information Assurance CertificationGIAC Certified Incident Handler (GCIH) | Global Information Assurance CertificationGIAC Advisory Board Member | Global Information Assurance CertificationCertified Cyber Defender (CCD) | CyberDefendersCyber Threat Intelligence Practitioner | arcXAdvanced Cyber Threat Intelligence | arcXPalo Alto Networks Certified Network Security Administrator (PCNSA) | PaloAlto Networks
Laura Pompeu

Reviewed by

Laura PompeuCybersecurity Content Writer

Content strategist at Proven Data focused on cybersecurity education, threat analysis, and ransomware awareness.

The Cloud Security Onion: Peeling the Layers within the Cloud Security Realm | Women in CyberSecurity (WiCyS)What is Generative AI and What are the Security Considerations? | BrightTALKGoogle AI Essentials | GoogleBachelor's degree, Journalism, Mass Communication & Media Studies, Pontifical Catholic University of Campinas