DarkSide Ransomware: Threat Profile, Attack Chain, and Detection



DarkSide was a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation first observed in August 2020. In about nine months, it collected more than $90 million in Bitcoin ransom payments, and in May 2021 it forced Colonial Pipeline to shut down 5,500 miles of fuel infrastructure. The group then disbanded, but its developers and affiliates remained active under other names. DarkSide's people and playbook are still part of the threat incident response teams face today.
The FBI later linked developers and launderers behind ALPHV/BlackCat to DarkSide and its successor, BlackMatter. The mandatory cybersecurity rules for fuel-transport operators written after Colonial still bind operators.
DarkSide ransomware at a glance
| Attribute | Details |
|---|---|
| First observed | August 2020 |
| Current status | Defunct. Self-announced shutdown on May 13–14, 2021. No law enforcement agency has claimed a takedown. No leak-site activity since May 2021 |
| Also tracked as | GOLD WATERFALL (Secureworks); linked to CARBON SPIDER (CrowdStrike) |
| Operating model | RaaS: developers supplied the malware and infrastructure; affiliates ran the intrusions |
| Extortion model | Double extortion, with DDoS and customer-contact pressure offered to affiliates (later called quadruple extortion) |
| Encryption | Windows: Salsa20 + RSA-1024. Linux/ESXi: ChaCha20 + RSA-4096 |
| Encrypted file extension | Unique per victim, derived from a victim ID |
| Ransom note filename | README.[victim ID].TXT |
| Platforms targeted | Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi |
| Typical demand | $200,000–$2 million |
| Primary sectors | Manufacturing, financial services, legal, professional services, retail, technology, energy |
| Public decryptor | No |
| Successor brands | BlackMatter (July–Nov 2021); developers and launderers linked to ALPHV/BlackCat (FBI, April 2022) |
| Attribution confidence | High confidence that it was financially motivated cybercrime, with operators believed to be in Eastern Europe. No evidence of state direction |
What is DarkSide ransomware?
DarkSide ransomware is file-encrypting malware licensed to affiliates, who deployed it in double extortion attacks: exfiltrating data first, then threatening to publish it. The CISA and FBI joint advisory AA21-131A describes the developers taking a share of each affiliate’s ransom.
The operators ran DarkSide as a structured criminal enterprise. It published a "code of conduct" saying it would not attack hospitals, schools, universities, nonprofits, or government agencies. In October 2020, it donated $20,000 in stolen funds to charity for publicity. By December 2020, it was inviting journalists and data recovery firms to follow a "press center" on its leak site.
Some researchers have reported possible code overlaps with REvil (Sodinokibi): the structure of the ransom note, the PowerShell command used to delete shadow copies, and an identical check that skips victims in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. The ransom note also resembles Babuk's.
Those overlaps point to shared tooling or shared people, not to proven common authorship. Reporting places the operators in Eastern Europe, and U.S. officials said after the Colonial attack that there was no indication of nation-state involvement.
How the DarkSide RaaS model worked
In a RaaS model, the people who write the ransomware are not the people who break into the network. According to the U.S. Department of State, each DarkSide affiliate chose its own intrusion method and negotiated its own ransom terms.
Blockchain analysis shows how the money was split. The developer took about 25% of ransoms under $500,000, falling to 10% for ransoms over $5 million. Of the 47 wallets traced, $15.5 million (17%) went to the developer and $74.7 million (83%) to affiliates. The analysis treats those figures as a lower bound.
The forensic implication is that the actor who deployed DarkSide was usually not the actor who built it, and sometimes not the one who first got in. DarkSide's operators reportedly admitted that affiliates bought network access without knowing how they obtained it.
History and evolution
Each stage of DarkSide's evolution widened its reach: a closed group became an affiliate program, and its members resurfaced as BlackMatter before being linked to BlackCat.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| August 2020 | DarkSide ransomware first observed |
| October 2020 | Group donates $20,000 in stolen funds to charity |
| November 2020 | RaaS opened to affiliates; leak site and content delivery network for stolen data launched |
| December 2020 | "Press center" announced for media and recovery firms |
| March 2021 | DarkSide 2.0 released |
| April–May 2021 | Brenntag attacked; pays 78.5 BTC (about $4.4 million) on May 11 |
| May 7, 2021 | Colonial Pipeline attack |
| May 13–14, 2021 | DarkSide tells affiliates it has lost its servers and funds and shuts down |
| June 7, 2021 | U.S. Department of Justice seizes 63.7 BTC of Colonial's ransom |
| July 2021 | BlackMatter appears, widely assessed as a DarkSide rebrand |
| November 2021 | BlackMatter shuts down; State Department offers rewards of up to $10 million for DarkSide's leaders |
| April 2022 | FBI FLASH links BlackCat developers and money launderers to DarkSide and BlackMatter |
The FBI described BlackCat as linked to DarkSide and BlackMatter, not identical to them. That distinction matters for anyone reading the lineage forward to BlackCat's own collapse.
Who DarkSide targeted
DarkSide practiced big game hunting: affiliates selected victims by revenue and ability to pay. Threat researchers found the group researched targets' financial records before setting a demand, and the State Department reported campaigns in more than 15 countries. Security telemetry reportedly placed the United States first in detections, followed by France, Belgium, and Canada.
| Sector | Risk profile |
|---|---|
| Energy and utilities | Colonial Pipeline and Brazil's Copel; downtime has public consequences, which adds pressure to pay |
| Manufacturing and chemicals | Brenntag, Toshiba Tec; operational stoppage costs rise quickly |
| Managed service providers | CompuCom; one compromise can reach many downstream clients |
| Retail and distribution | Guess, Home Hardware; customer and payment data |
| Professional and legal services | Confidential client data used as extortion material |
The same blockchain analysis, citing leak-site monitoring data, counted 99 infected organizations, about 47% of which paid, with an average payment of roughly $1.9 million.
The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack
The Colonial Pipeline attack was a DarkSide affiliate intrusion that encrypted the company's IT network on May 7, 2021, and led Colonial to shut down a fuel line carrying about 45% of the fuel used on the U.S. East Coast. The ransomware never reached the company's operational technology (OT) systems. Colonial halted fuel delivery itself as a precaution, according to CISA.
| Date (2021) | Event |
|---|---|
| May 7 | Employee finds a ransom note on a control-room computer; Colonial shuts down the entire system. About 100 GB of data had already been stolen |
| May 8 | Colonial pays 75 BTC, about $4.4 million at the time |
| May 9 | FMCSA emergency declaration covering 17 states and Washington, D.C. |
| May 10 | FBI confirms DarkSide; the group posts that its goal is "to make money" and promises to vet affiliates' targets |
| May 12 | Fuel delivery restart begins, about six days after the shutdown |
| May 27 | TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 requires incident reporting to CISA within 12 hours |
| June 7 | DOJ seizes 63.7 BTC, worth about $2.3 million after Bitcoin's fall in value |
| June 8 | Then-CEO Joseph Blount testifies to the U.S. Senate |
Joseph Blount, Colonial's CEO at the time, told senators the attackers got in through a legacy VPN profile that was no longer meant to be used and had only single-factor authentication. Although he described the password as complex, investigators had not established how the attackers obtained it, and later accounts attributing it to a former employee or an earlier breach were not confirmed by the testimony.
Paying the ransom did not buy a quick recovery: Blount told the Senate it took about a month to restore seven financial systems. The disruption also spread well beyond the company, as panic buying left 73% of metro Atlanta gas stations without fuel at the peak, according to GasBuddy.
That public impact directly prompted Executive Order 14028 and the first mandatory cybersecurity rules for U.S. fuel-transport operators.
Proven Data's coverage of the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack examines the incident in more detail.
DarkSide attack lifecycle
A DarkSide intrusion ran in eight hands-on phases, from first access to extortion, with each step carried out manually by the affiliate rather than automated.
Phase 1: Initial access
CISA lists three entry routes: phishing (T1566), exploiting public-facing applications (T1190), and abusing external remote services such as RDP, VPN, and virtual desktop infrastructure (T1133). Alongside these, affiliates bought credentials from initial access brokers, criminals who sell footholds in corporate networks.
Phase 2: Execution and persistence
Once inside, affiliates maintained access through RDP and remote-access tools such as AnyDesk, TightVNC, and GoToAssist, while Cobalt Strike beacons provided a secondary command-and-control (C2) channel.
Phase 3: Discovery and credential access
With persistence in place, affiliates mapped the environment and harvested credentials. Incident analyses documented PowerShell, Metasploit, Mimikatz, and BloodHound in this phase, and public tracker data adds AdFind, ADRecon, Advanced IP Scanner, SoftPerfect NetScan, and CrackMapExec. The credentials themselves came from LSASS memory and from NTDS, the Active Directory database.
Phase 4: Lateral movement
The goal of lateral movement was the domain controller. Affiliates used the harvested credentials to move through the network with PsExec and RDP, and once they controlled Active Directory, they used the domain controller's network share to push the ransomware to connected machines.
Phase 5: Data exfiltration
Before deploying the payload, affiliates staged and stole data. They compressed files with 7-Zip and sent them out with Rclone, the Mega client, or PuTTY, then stored them on Mega, PrivatLab, and DarkSide's own Tor-hosted leak sites. Because exfiltration came immediately before encryption, it fell within the window when egress monitoring is most likely to flag abnormal transfer volumes.
Phase 6: Defense evasion and inhibiting recovery
To deliver the payload, affiliates relied on Certutil and Bitsadmin, native Windows binaries abused as living-off-the-land tools (LOLBins). The payload then ran its CIS language and location check and, before encrypting, deleted Volume Shadow Copies through PowerShell or WMI, stopped services, and interfered with security tooling.
Phase 7: Encryption
CISA confirms that DarkSide used Salsa20 and RSA encryption, and researchers reported a split by platform: Windows builds paired Salsa20 with RSA-1024, while Linux builds used ChaCha20 with RSA-4096 and targeted VMware ESXi hosts. On both platforms, each victim received a unique file extension and a ransom note named after its victim ID.
Phase 8: Extortion and negotiation
After encryption, victims were directed to a Tor negotiation portal and threatened to publish their stolen data. Researchers reported that DarkSide also offered affiliates DDoS attacks and call-center pressure on victims' customers, an early form of what is now called "quadruple extortion," and that it followed through by leaking stolen files from victims who refused to pay.
"Security tools being disabled, shadow copies being deleted, backup consoles being accessed, remote execution spreading across systems, and payloads staged on admin shares. When those events cluster within minutes, we treat it as ransomware deployment in progress, not isolated suspicious activity." Magdy Abdelaziz, Head of DFIR, Proven Data
How DarkSide intrusions were detected
DarkSide's file hashes date from 2020–2021, and CISA's Malware Analysis Report holds the authoritative set. The lasting detection value is in its tradecraft. Cobalt Strike, Rclone, PsExec, and Tor-tunneled RDP stayed standard in later ransomware operations.
The behaviors below clustered in the hours before encryption, which makes them strong threat hunting hypotheses:
- Outbound Tor connections on port 443 from servers that should never use Tor
- Rclone or Mega client running on a file server or domain controller
- PsExec or remote service creation launched from a domain controller to many hosts
- Shadow copy deletion followed by service stops within minutes
- New privileged accounts or remote-access tools installed outside change windows
- VPN logins to dormant or legacy profiles, especially without a multi-factor authentication (MFA) event
Tools DarkSide affiliates used
| Category | Tools |
|---|---|
| Discovery | AdFind, ADRecon, BloodHound, Advanced IP Scanner, SoftPerfect NetScan |
| Credential theft | Mimikatz, SessionGopher |
| Lateral movement | PsExec, CrackMapExec, Impacket |
| Remote access | AnyDesk, TightVNC, GoToAssist, Plink |
| Download | Certutil, Bitsadmin |
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
DarkSide's observed behavior maps to 18 MITRE ATT&CK techniques across 10 tactics, all documented in public reporting.
| Tactic | Technique | ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | Phishing | T1566 | Observed |
| Initial Access | Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | Observed |
| Initial Access | External Remote Services | T1133 | Observed |
| Initial Access | Valid Accounts | T1078 | Observed |
| Execution | PowerShell | T1059.001 | Observed |
| Execution | Windows Management Instrumentation | T1047 | Observed |
| Credential Access | LSASS Memory | T1003.001 | Observed |
| Credential Access | NTDS | T1003.003 | Observed |
| Discovery | Domain Trust Discovery | T1482 | Observed |
| Lateral Movement | Remote Desktop Protocol | T1021.001 | Observed |
| Lateral Movement | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | T1021.002 | Observed |
| Collection | Archive via Utility | T1560.001 | Observed |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | T1567.002 | Observed |
| Command and Control | Multi-hop Proxy | T1090.003 | Observed |
| Defense Evasion | Disable or Modify Tools | T1562.001 | Observed |
| Impact | Inhibit System Recovery | T1490 | Observed |
| Impact | Service Stop | T1489 | Observed |
| Impact | Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 | Observed |
Lessons learned from DarkSide
DarkSide's short run left four lessons that apply to any group built on the same affiliate model. According to Amr Fathy, Senior DFIR Engineer at Proven Data, the costliest of them tends to surface during recovery, when persistence planted by the attackers, such as a weekly task that re-downloads a beacon or a modified Group Policy Object (GPO) that pushes malicious logon scripts, survives the rebuild. His team has seen clients re-compromised within 48 hours from a poisoned GPO in a restored Active Directory backup.
Track ransomware affiliates, not brands
When DarkSide shut itself down, its affiliates and infrastructure moved to a successor brand within two months, which is why tracking an affiliate's tradecraft tells defenders more than tracking the name on the ransom note.
Scope data exfiltration before recovery
Even victims with good backups still faced publication, so they must scope exfiltration before deciding how to recover.
Proven Data's guide to double extortion ransomware covers how that pressure works.
Report early and preserve ransom evidence
The Department of Justice (DOJ) credited Colonial's quick notification to the FBI with the seizure that followed, a result that depends on preserving logs, wallet details, and ransom communications from the start.
Validate Active Directory backups before restoring
Because DarkSide affiliates pushed the payload from the DC share, Active Directory was part of the attack path, and any AD backup taken after the intrusion carried that compromise into the restored environment.
Can files encrypted by DarkSide be recovered?
No public DarkSide decryptor exists, and none has been released since the group shut down. Although DarkSide said in May 2021 that it would give decryptors to its affiliates, it never published the master keys, and the affiliates who held them cannot be contacted.
The cryptography offers no way in either: Salsa20 and ChaCha20 are sound stream ciphers, and with per-file keys protected by RSA, recovering files without the private key is not practical.
Recovery therefore comes down to three routes:
- Clean, isolated backups
- Storage-layer snapshots or replicas the attackers did not reach
- Forensic recovery of files the encryption missed or only partly processed
Because forensic recovery depends on how each file was processed, a ransomware recovery team should assess older encrypted data from 2020–2021 case by case before anyone assumes it is lost.

Written by
Cybersecurity writer at Proven Data covering ransomware trends, incident response, and data protection best practices.

Written by
Magdy Abdelaziz is a dedicated cybersecurity professional with over 7 years of extensive experience in digital forensics, incident response, reverse engineering, and security operations. He currently serves as Head of Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) at Proven Data LLC, leading a multinational team to develop and execute incident response strategies, align security initiatives with business objectives, and manage global-scale incidents.

Reviewed by
Content strategist at Proven Data focused on cybersecurity education, threat analysis, and ransomware awareness.





